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An enduring puzzle in achieving progress toward universal
and reliable water service delivery in Africa is overcoming bar-
riers to sustainable water user payments for
community-managed handpumps (Harvey & Reed, 2004).
The nonfunctioning of one third of the handpumps in rural
Africa (RWSN, 2009) has resulted in an uncertain return on
the USD 1.2–1.5 billion of infrastructure investments in the last
two decades (Baumann, 2009). Increasing water service cover-
age has failed to translate into a guarantee of reliable service
delivery (Hope & Rouse, 2013; Therkildsen, 1988; Thompson
et al., 2001). The long repair times that contribute to high
handpump failure rates in rural Africa are essentially associ-
ated with weak payment systems (Foster, 2013; Harvey,
2007; RWSN, 2009). Community management of water ser-
vices has been widely identiﬁed as a dominant but failing model
in rural water service delivery in Africa (Bannerjee & Morella,
2011; Hope, 2014) with growing evidence that improved pay-
ment systems promote handpump sustainability (Foster,
2013). Increasing opportunities to exploit the new, inclusive,
and low-cost mobile infrastructure oﬀer new but untested
approaches to accelerate and maintain reliable water services
for the 273 million rural Africans without improved water cov-
erage (Hope, Foster, & Thomson, 2012; WHO/UNICEF,
2014). The policy implications are relevant to the post-2015
debate on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and
may increase momentum for universal and sustainable water
services within the framework of the Human Right to Water
and Sanitation (UNGA, 2010).
In this paper, three major barriers to achieving regular rural
water user payments to promote ﬁnancial sustainability are
identiﬁed and empirically examined. First, institutional barri-
ers indicate that the organizational structure of the user group
inﬂuences the regular collection of user fees from all hand-
pump users. Second, due to geographic barriers, handpump
density in certain areas can negatively impact payment behav-
ior. Third, operational barriers frequently cause handpumps to
remain unrepaired for an extended period, discouraging users
from paying, as the source is considered unreliable. This
constitutes a vicious cycle with the risk of long-term failure
in service delivery.
The paper makes novel contributions to the literature by (a)
drawing on unique hourly data on observed handpump usage397over a 12-month period, (b) relating water use estimates to
current and future payment preferences, and (c) applying pub-
lic goods theory to community water management structures
to examine new approaches to overcome ﬁnancial sustainabil-
ity barriers. In conclusion, an output-based payment frame-
work is outlined as a potentially replicable approach to
support the Government of Kenya’s and the global drive to
universal and reliable water services.2. CONTEXT
(a) The rural water challenge
Since the latter years of the Decade of International Drink-
ing Water Supply and Sanitation, 1981–90, community man-
agement of rural water supply has been advocated by
international organizations, governmental and nongovern-
mental alike (Briscoe & de Ferranti, 1988; Carter, Tyrell, &
Howsam, 1999; Churchill et al., 1987; Harvey & Reed, 2004;
Jime´nez & Pe´rez-Foguet, 2010; Therkildsen, 1988;
Whittington et al., 2008). The empowerment of communities
is based on the principles of participation, decision-making,
control, ownership, and cost-sharing (Briscoe & de Ferranti,
1988; Lockwood, 2004). However, despite the positive charac-
teristics of community management, operations and mainte-
nance have barely improved (Blaikie, 2006; Lockwood,
2004). Failure is largely blamed on poor planning and service
delivery (Carter, Harvey, & Casey, 2010; Carter et al., 1999;
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ited community ﬁnancing (Carter et al., 2010; Harvey, 2007;
Harvey & Reed, 2004; Skinner, 2009) and shortcomings in
the institutional design of management models (Sara &
Katz, 2010; Whittington et al., 2008). Consequently, rural
water supplies are in danger of falling into a spiral of decline
in the post-construction phase (Rouse, 2013). Adoption of
simpliﬁed infrastructure asset management principles can
increase cost-eﬀectiveness and reduce interruptions in service
(Boulenouar & Schweitzer, 2015). While maintaining the
community-based model, new approaches are therefore
required which acknowledge the communities’ inability to
maintain their water supply without support in the long term
(Harvey & Reed, 2004; Lockwood, 2004).
(b) Deconstructing the rural water challenge
(i) Institutional choices
Institutions, “the humanly devised constraints that structure
political, economic and social interaction” (North, 1991, p.
97), evolve over time and are adapted to speciﬁc human needs.
This study focuses on those institutions that have been created
for the management of groundwater resources, and speciﬁcally
for managing handpumps in rural areas. Due to its delineation
of management systems along the lines of rivalry of consump-
tion and exclusion, the theory of public goods, building on
Samuelson (1964), is chosen for analyzing the institutional
design at community level. Two versions of the theory are
applied – Ostrom’s (1990) understanding of common pool
resources (CPRs) and Buchanan’s (1965) deﬁnition of club
goods. While the nonexcludable and rivalrous CPR is a “nat-
ural or man-made resource system that is suﬃciently large as
to make it costly. . . to exclude potential beneﬁciaries from
obtaining beneﬁts from its use” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 30), the
excludable and nonrivalrous club good determines a member-
ship margin at “the size of the most desirable cost and con-
sumption arrangement” (Buchanan, 1965, p. 2). Ostrom
(1990) deﬁnes principles for robust common pool resource
institutions, requiring clear institutional rules and solution
mechanisms. Buchanan’s (1965) criteria for the management
of club goods expand on the public–private spectrum and
emphasize consumption/ownership/membership arrange-
ments. Consumption-sharing models, tariﬀs, and membership
levels are determined by the local communities according to
their particular requirements to prevent “congestion”.
If adapted to handpump management, the institutional
design is a response to varying group preferences with implica-
tions for payment behavior: Some groups prefer higher pay-
ments at household level to be able to limit abstraction
levels by reducing the number of users (with the tendency of
organizing themselves as “handpump clubs” with a more
exclusive membership); others prefer lower individual pay-
ments but with higher membership numbers to ensure that
enough money is available to pay for maintenance bills (acting
more as common pool resource groups). Agrawal and Gibson
suggest that communities must be examined “by focusing on
the multiple interests and actors within communities, on
how these actors inﬂuence decision-making, and on the inter-
nal and external institutions that shape the decision-making
process” (1999, p. 629). It is beyond the scope of this research
to analyze these aspects, as the focus is on the group’s collab-
orative decision-making on willingness-to-pay. However, it is
acknowledged that the institutional structure of user groups
may change in response to internal power relations or external
factors, such as population growth or increasing aridity. The
latter may reinforce a potential tendency toward excludability,which some groups pursue to counteract congestion and
over-abstraction. Only by understanding the institutional
design of rural user groups can payment models be adapted
to local needs.
(ii) Geographic challenges and infrastructure decisions
A problem speciﬁc to sub-Saharan Africa is that low popu-
lation density encourages broad spatial distribution between
handpumps and the clustering of systems around existing
infrastructure (Harvey & Reed, 2004). This implies high
opportunity costs for users, often women, who have to walk
long distances to the next-best pump alternative when their
usual pump breaks (Van Houweling, Hall, Diop, Davis, &
Seiss, 2012). As the most urgent demand tends to occur in
areas of widely scattered pumps, geography appears to have
an important impact on payment behavior. Another geo-
graphical aspect is the distance of handpumps to spare parts
outlets, which impacts the reliability of service delivery
(Harvey & Reed, 2006). Similarly, Foster (2013) found that
distance from the district/county capital city is signiﬁcantly
associated with nonfunctionality of handpumps in a study
covering 25,000 pumps across three countries in sub-Saharan
Africa.
(iii) Demand and service level
Since the Dublin Principles of 1992 (ICWE, 1992), the
demand-responsive approach has provided the template for
most rural water supply services. It focuses on both ﬁnancial
and managerial sustainability through participatory planning,
informed choices, community management, and cost recovery
or cost-sharing arrangements (Sara & Katz, 2010). It involves
households in the choice of technological and institutional
arrangements, while requiring them to pay for the service
(Whittington et al., 2008). According to this approach, com-
munities rather than donors or governments make informed
choices about the preferred service level, which is reﬂected in
their willingness-to-pay. They also decide on service delivery
mechanisms, operation and maintenance of services as well
as the management of and accounting for funds and the degree
to which the private sector is involved (Deverill, Bibby,
Wedgwood, & Smout, 2001; Lockwood, 2004; The World
Bank Water Demand Research Team, 1993). To best serve
the users’ preferences, economic and social constraints are
considered in the user group’s institutional design. These com-
prise informal constraints, including sanctions, taboos and
codes of conduct, as well as formal rules (North, 1991), includ-
ing property rights.
However, in practice the success of the demand-responsive
approach can be thwarted through lack of acceptability, feasi-
bility, or the limited capacity of communities to sustain the
chosen option (Harvey & Reed, 2004; Skinner, 2003). The fail-
ure of communities to speedily repair their handpumps results
in longer term nonfunctionality causing discontent among
water users, who then look for alternatives and refrain from
paying fees – a process that leads to a downward spiral in
water services (Cross & Morel, 2005). To counter such a
downward development, supra-communal management
options should be considered for rural water services recogniz-
ing the critical importance of the interface between a
community-based model and the local community it is meant
to serve (Blaikie, 2006). Bannerjee and Morella (2011) demon-
strate that central, regional, or local governments play a dom-
inant role in all aspects of energy, road, and water
infrastructure provision across Africa. However, it is only in
the area of providing and maintaining water services where
local communities are given a leading role – precisely the area
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Alternatives such as private rural water service providers are
promoted by Kleemeier and Narkevic (2010), who argue for
private ﬁrms or individuals to receive long-term
government-let contracts to design, build or rehabilitate, oper-
ate, and maintain water supplies within a deﬁned geographical
area.3. STUDY SITE AND METHODOLOGY
(a) Study site
The study site comprises the Kyuso District, Kenya, (38
100E, 0 350S; 660–880 m elevation; 2,446 km2) located
267 km east of Nairobi with a population of 26,848 house-
holds (Government of Kenya, 2009). The population is almost
entirely rural (99%) with 62% living in absolute poverty – one
of the highest rates in Kenya (KIHBS, 2006). Frequent
droughts exacerbate the area’s poverty by adversely aﬀecting
the farmers’ major source of income from crop yields and live-
stock (Oﬃce of the Prime Minister, 2009). The mean annual
temperature ranges between 26 C and 34 C. The bi-modal
rainfall pattern, with long rains from March to May and
short, heavier rains from October to December, drives hand-
pump usage patterns with pumps more heavily used in the
dry season. An estimated 70% of households rely on unim-
proved sources, such as ponds and rivers (Oﬃce of the
Prime Minister, 2009), which have negative health implica-
tions. Of the remainder, 30% use wells or boreholes, which
include 66 Afridev handpumps installed over the last 20 years
(see Figure 1).
As part of Oxford University’s “Smart Handpumps Project”
these 66 pumps have been equipped with mobile-enabled
transmitters reporting hourly pump usage to a central server
via SMS (Thomson, Hope, & Foster, 2012a). About half the
pumps are “actively managed” and send data automatically
to the server. The others are “silent” with usage data being
recorded for later analysis, while disruptions are monitored
by users through crowd-sourcing (Thomson, Hope, &
Foster, 2012b). Following water user committee (WUC)
approval, robust stickers were attached to the silent pumps,
providing contact information for users to call in case of
breakdowns. When a handpump failure is noted, a mechanic
is dispatched immediately to assess and ﬁx the problem.
Consistent with Marks and Davis’ (2012) ﬁnding that reliable
and regular access to the water source (a piped system in their
case) signiﬁcantly enhances community members’ sense of
ownership, this service was provided for free on the assump-
tion that a good service had to be demonstrated in order to
establish the maintenance model was viable and build trust
that a faster repair service was feasible. This study examines
the willingness-to-pay preferences of rural water users after
experiencing the service for a 1-year trial period. The auto-
mated monitoring technology provides unprecedented infor-
mation on handpump usage thus creating the basis for
institutional and ﬁnancial progress in rural water supply.
During 2013, the year of the study, handpumps broke two
times per year on average; however, the range was between
zero and 11, which led to a high variation in repair cost rang-
ing from USD 54 to USD 649 per pump per year with an aver-
age repair cost of USD 62 (Oxford/RFL, 2014).
The unpredictability of pump failures and the variation in
cost indicate that pooling payments across the District may
aﬀord the users higher security against water risks. Therefore,
a supra-communal management structure was proposed bythe “Smart Handpumps Project” to explore a mobile payment
platform that could build on high (73%) use of mobile money
services in Kyuso District (Oxford/RFL, 2014). In such a
scheme all members would contribute monthly cash payments
to be deposited into a designated mobile payments (M-PESA)
account by the water user committee treasurer. SMS messages
would subsequently inform users that their fees have been
received and deposited into the account, thus creating greater
transparency and accountability for the user group. If pooled,
even costly repairs can be covered following an
insurance-based approach.
During handpump downtimes in the dry season, 77% of
households report using a nonpump alternative drinking water
source, whereas 64% use such sources during the wet season,
which may cause seasonal shifts in pump revenue. Two major
alternative sources in the area are Kiambere water pipeline
and Ngomeni rock catchment, which provide piped water
through kiosks (USD 0.02/20 liters) for people living in the
limited service area.
(b) Methodology
(i) Sampling framework and hypotheses
Four factors are hypothesized to be major inﬂuences on
demand for a certain service level of rural water supply: hand-
pump service reliability, handpump density, water use, and
water quality. The ﬁrst three factors form the basis of the sam-
pling framework and the analysis in this paper. Water quality
is not examined here but is a goal of further research in the
site. The institutional framework depicts an organization of
users whose preferences determine payment level and mode
in order to achieve a certain service level supply (Figure 2).
The institutional design of the water user group is a key factor
in achieving regular rural water user payments as it constitutes
a link between the individual user and the supra-communal
management structure in terms of personal involvement in
the user group and willingness-to-pay.
The following four hypotheses are tested in this study to
analyze the barriers to rural water user payments.
(1) Institutional design and management
The institutional design of the user group – with a tendency
to either a “handpump club” or a common pool resource
group – is, inter alia, an expression of its preferences, and it
inﬂuences payment behavior. Therefore applying public goods
theory to communal management of handpumps provides a
useful framework of analysis. Buchanan’s theory of clubs
(1965) is concerned with the highest attainable utility for the
individual with respect to the optimum size of groups. Too
large a number of handpump users may implicate long queu-
ing for water or cause over-abstraction, which represents a
form of congestion in Buchanan’s terminology, as the con-
sumption of the sustainable quantity of the good may be
exceeded. Some user groups are therefore expected to opt
for an institutional design with higher levels of excludability,
although this requires higher payment levels by individual
users. Thus, user groups are characterized by diﬀerent levels
of physical, ﬁnancial, and social excludability. Hence, we
hypothesize that the institutional design of the user group
aﬀects willingness-to-pay levels (H1).
As water abstraction levels are an expression of demand –
with higher levels being more likely to lead to “congestion”
– this study suggests that the organizational structure of the
user group and the associated willingness-to-pay are linked
to handpump usage. It is tested whether handpump user
groups with a high water demand are prone to opt for more
exclusive management arrangements (H2).
Figure 1. Map of study area.
Figure 2. Framework of analysis.
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A household’s willingness-to-pay depends on existing alter-
natives (The World Bank Water Demand Research Team,
1993), as people attribute a high value to the time spent on col-
lecting water (Whittington, Mu, & Roche, 1990). Briscoe
(1996) argues that opportunity costs are substantially higher,
all other things being equal, in arid, high-demand areas. More-
over, he points out that the existence of opportunity costs cangive rise to conﬂicts among users, unless institutional mecha-
nisms exist which recognize these costs. The inﬂuence of exist-
ing alternative handpump sources on willingness-to-pay is
therefore tested with the third hypothesis: Payment levels are
related to handpump density; higher payments occur at more
isolated pumps (H3).
Thus, the sampling framework included three classes of
handpump density: single pumps, pairs, and clusters. Single
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have one alternative pump closer than 1.5 km and at times
share management arrangements; clusters have three or more
pumps within a radius of 1.5 km. This deﬁnition was derived
from two pumps with the longest distance between them
(1.3 km) but shared management.
(3) Maintenance service reliability
According to Narayan, “a service can be considered reliable
when it has a high probability of being available in the quality,
quantity, and at the time required. Since attaining reliability
has a ﬁnancial cost, the standard acceptable to users will vary
depending on the particular context” (1993, p. 33). Thus reli-
ability of the maintenance service and ﬁnancial sustainability
are interdependent (The World Bank Water Demand
Research Team, 1993). This insight leads to the fourth hypoth-
esis that payments are contingent on service delivery (H4).
(ii) Ethics statement
Ethical permission was granted from Oxford University’s
Central University Research Ethics Committee and the
National Council of Science and Technology, Kenya, based
on the following consent procedure. All respondents were
adults (over 18 years of age) who provided oral consent to vol-
untarily participate. Oral consent is the local, socio-cultural
norm and accepted practice. At the beginning of each focus
group discussion (FGD), the following criteria were con-
ﬁrmed: (a) the respondents’ membership of the handpump
user group, (b) summary of the project purpose with govern-
ment support, (c) project contact name and mobile number,
(d) voluntary exercise, and (e) anonymity.
(iii) Data collection
Data collection comprised three linked components led by
Oxford University’s Smart Handpumps Project: (1) a baseline
survey in 2012, (2) handpump monitoring using mobile trans-
mitters (January to December 2013), (3) focus group discus-
sions in June/July and November/December 2013.
Oxford/RFL (2014) provides details on the ﬁrst two compo-
nents which are brieﬂy discussed here to contextualize the ﬁnd-
ings from the third component, which aﬀords new knowledge
and insights linking water use with payment behaviors.
(1) Baseline survey
In July 2012, after training and piloting the instrument, a
team of ﬁve experienced enumerators (four women, one
man) administered a revised baseline survey in either the local
language Kikamba (54%) or Kiswahili (46%), according to the
respondent’s preference. A random sample (32%) of the
universe of handpumps was selected and interviews were con-
ducted with any person who drew water for their household
on the day of sampling (n = 118) (Hope, 2014; Oxford/RFL,
2014). The majority of sampled respondents were female
(64%) with an average age of 41 years. The informants repre-
sented households with an average of 5.3 members.
Before the handpump maintenance trial started in January
2013, 56% of users paid for water in some way with the
majority of payments (80%) coordinated by the water user
committee. Payment for water has traditionally been col-
lected as monthly fees (31.5%), when the pumps break
(26.6%), per 20-liter jerrycan (19.3%), as membership fees
(16.7%) or by livestock usage (8.9%) (Oxford/RFL, 2014).
However, only 24% of users had suﬃcient funds saved when
the pump broke. For the other groups, on average 18 days
were required to raise funds, with a range of 1–180 days.
The average time from pump breakage to repair was 27 days
(Oxford/RFL, 2014).(2) Handpump monitoring
As described above, the water data transmitters installed in
all 66 handpumps either send or record hourly information
on handpump usage and associated volumetric use
(Thomson et al., 2012a), depending on which arm of the study
they are in. These data are used for correlation with
willingness-to-pay levels and institutional design.
(3) Focus group discussions
To inclusively and reﬂexively explore community prefer-
ences to institutional barriers and opportunities, focus group
discussions (FGD) were administered by two Kikamba native
speakers supported by the lead author. A total of 63 ﬁeld days
were spent in 66 handpump communities in the periods
June/July and November/December 2013. Enumerators
co-developed, piloted, and reﬁned the discussion framework
subject to the composition (gender, size, location) of the focus
groups. In doing so, they adhered to a structured process of (a)
pre-planning discussion purpose and delivery (lead and rap-
porteur), (b) community liaison to timetable the meeting, (c)
community discussion, and (d) debrief and write-up on the
same day (see Table 1).
In the ﬁrst phase 32 of the 66 handpumps were systemati-
cally sampled according to the following criteria: density cat-
egory, experience of service and level of usage. In round two
the remaining 34 handpumps were sampled. Follow-up focus
groups were conducted at the community pumps. In the ﬁrst
round groups were divided by gender. This methodology
was chosen because women might be reluctant to state their
own preferences in the presence of men (The World Bank
Water Demand Research Team, 1993). The follow-up was
conducted in mixed groups because groups had met in the
interim to discuss the proposals. Participants ranged in age
from 20 to 80 years and represented both users with and with-
out mobile phones. FGD methods included mapping the water
user community with alternative sources, a seasonal calendar,
and a timeline on handpump maintenance (Narayanasamy,
2009).
A group willingness-to-pay activity was designed to iden-
tify how much each water user group would be willing to
pay for a continuation of the existing maintenance service
at the conclusion of the free maintenance trial in December
2013. No maintenance service standard was guaranteed as
the aim was to understand individual community preferences
based on their experience of the service. Community
experiences varied from no maintenance response, as 30%
of handpumps did not fail in 2013, through to communities
having had their handpump repaired on at least one
occasion. A willingness-to-pay design was chosen as a means
to initiate community debate on payments collectively.
Without rehearsing the extensive literature critiquing
willingness-to-pay studies conducted with individuals
(Hensher, Shore, & Train, 2005; Merrett, 2002) or collec-
tively (Wiser, 2007), well-established biases (strategic, protest
vote, anchor) and limitations (temporal invariance,
intra-household dynamics, social dynamics, computation)
are acknowledged. Davis’ study (2004) on the eﬀects of the
mode of data elicitation on results obtained in
demand-assessment research demonstrates that the explana-
tory power is highest in a combination of focus groups and
subsequent self-administered questionnaires, which she
attributes largely to additional time for contemplation. We
acknowledge this ﬁnding, however, as in our case group
decision-making was the objective for a standard payment
level per user group, we replaced the questionnaires by
follow-up focus groups leaving time for each group to reach
Table 1. Composition of focus groups and number of interviewees
Handpump user group Total number of participants/interviewees Number of female participants Number of male participants
Total (users) 1692 639 348 291
Median 15 8 4 4
Mean 26 10 5 5
Min 1 1 0 0
Max 157 41 37 20
Table 2. Factors of excludability
Exclusion type Percent of pumps (%) Description
Physical excludability
1. Lock 77 Keys are only available to group members and are kept at a nearby house
2. Fence 59 Symbolic demarcation; Fence helps keep livestock out
3. Pump attendant 14 Pump attendant is employed to keep the keys and collect money. Alternatively, group
members rotate to ﬁll the position
Financial excludability
4. Membership joining fee 29 Membership joining fees since the installation of the pump are charged (payable in installments)
(average USD 35)
5. Nonmember fee 46 Fee collected for single use by nonmembers (usually USD 0.06/20 liters)
6. Regular payment 23 Monthly and weekly options are used (average USD 0.98/month)
7. Fines 52 Warranted for late fee payment or missing WUC or user group meetings
(between USD 0.06/oﬀence and USD 1.15/oﬀence)
Social excludability
8. Labor contributions 64 Contributions include ﬁxing fences or labor on a community crop scheme
9. Regular meetings 53 33% meet once a week, 18% once a month, 9% twice a month and 6% only when the pump is
broken; the remainder with infrequency or not at all
10. Usage rules 74 Rules include schedules and limits for pump use, especially during dry periods
402 WORLD DEVELOPMENTconsensus. Thus, we selected a ﬂexible and comprehensible
approach whose results were to inform the wider institutional
analysis; however, we do not claim nor wish to advance the
methodology. The research team did not suggest minimum
payment nor did it prescribe a payment system (from equal-
ity to a sole benefactor) but supported the group discussion
with a view to engage quieter members actively but respect-
fully in an inclusive discussion.
The members of the water user committee attending focus
group discussions were interviewed separately regarding
the current management of their committee, thus informing
the discussion on excludability. Additional interviews with
user group members provided insight into relevant group
dynamics.
Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used to ana-
lyze the data gathered in focus group discussions and inter-
views with 639 participants in June/July and
November/December 2013 as well as the 2012 baseline survey.
Data were analyzed in three steps: ﬁrstly, the quantitative
willingness-to-pay was analyzed according to the themes
developed in the sampling framework. The statistical program
SPSS, version 22, was used for the statistical tests. Secondly,
focus group transcripts were coded according to themes,
which added narrative to the quantitative ﬁndings (Miles &
Huberman, 1994). The analysis of excludability through a
ranking system determined management types as common
pool resources, club goods, or privately managed pumps.4. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND RURAL WATER
USER PAYMENTS
(a) Levels of excludability of handpump user groups
The institutional design of handpump user groups may con-
stitute a major obstacle to securing regular rural water user
payments. To test the hypothesis that the level of excludability
in the institutional design has an impact on willingness-to-pay
(H1), the data were classiﬁed into three diﬀerent categories of
excludability – physical, ﬁnancial, and social (Table 2). Pumps
may combine several types, thereby further increasing their
exclusivity. By counting the number of exclusion types in place
at each pump (assuming all exclusion types are equal, which is
a simpliﬁcation), a value for exclusivity was determined for
each, which allowed for their division into two groups: more
exclusive pumps (exclusivity levels six to ten) and less exclusive
pumps (exclusivity levels up to ﬁve). Drawing on public goods
theory, these two levels of exclusivity show a tendency toward
the institutional type of club goods (Buchanan, 1965) or com-
mon pool resources (Ostrom, 1990) respectively. The water
user committee plays an important role in administering rules
and regulations that deﬁne the exclusivity of the group. Purely
private pumps, which are the property of and are managed by
a single household, constitute the third category.
The average membership size of exclusive groups (27 mem-
bers) is 43% smaller than that of more inclusive groups (47
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(average 5.3 people), the diﬀerence is over 100 people.
Buchanan’s (1965) delineation of the highest attainable util-
ity for the individual within clubs is reﬂected in several user
groups’ endeavor to maintain an optimum size. Excludability
is meant to prevent queuing, wear on the pump,
over-abstraction, and potential rationing of the resource
(occurring at 28% of the pumps in the dry months). While
experiencing long, time-consuming queues, pumps with more
than 100 members can oﬀer lower membership fees. This
implies that there is a trade-oﬀ between an individual’s bene-
ﬁts, especially in the dry season, and their cost over the whole
year. When one pump (MIS-059) became too congested, users
increased the fee to USD 1.15 per month in 2007, which paid
for an attendant to enforce excludability. This led to a reduc-
tion in group size by 40% as people sought alternative sources.
(b) Eﬀects of excludability on rural water user payments
The application of public goods theory to the institutional
design of user groups reveals that themore exclusive handpump
clubs show a 43% higher average willingness-to-pay per mem-
ber per month (USD 1.03) than more inclusive groups classiﬁed
as common pool resource groups (USD 0.72). The ﬁnding is
signiﬁcant (t = 2.12; df = 57; p < 0.05), which supports
hypothesis H1 that a more exclusive form of management is
related to higher user payment levels (see Figure 3 and Table 3).
Excludability is a response to water supply risks and
trade-oﬀs between sustainable abstraction, aquifer variability,
handpump reliability and varying social demands. It is there-Figure 3. Institutional arrangement and willingness-to-pay (hofore an important feature of the institutional design of certain
handpump groups. Too small or too large a membership limits
group stability as demand can become insuﬃcient or excessive
(Carley, 1991). Through restricting membership, the good
becomes less rivalrous. At the point of equilibrium between
beneﬁt and cost, an individual’s preferences are best met,
which contributes to the group’s stability and the handpump’s
sustainability.
Hence, the institutional design of the user group determines
the operationalization of water user committee-administered
payments. More exclusive groups tend to impose tighter ﬁnan-
cial regulations to generate the required revenue for the pump.
They do not only achieve this through higher membership
fees, which correspond with club members’ 43% higher
willingness-to-pay for a more reliable water source, but also
through nonmembership fees, joining fees and ﬁnes. Abstrac-
tion quantity and geographical distribution inﬂuence the
decision-making process. On the other hand, some pump
groups charge a lower fee while having more members to
achieve the same overall revenue. Finally, some households
prefer to own their pumps – 16% of the pumps studied are pri-
vately managed. These owners demonstrate a high
willingness-to-pay. “I will pay whatever it takes to ensure
[the pump] is repaired” (pump NGO-065, June 22, 2013). This
is usually achieved by selling livestock. The implication of this
ﬁnding is that studies regarding pump ownership should
acknowledge the diﬀerent institutional designs and the forma-
tion of handpump clubs. Although in their research on sense
of ownership Marks and Davis (2012) refer to forms of partic-
ipation during water supply planning and construction, weusehold/month) as agreed by each handpump user group.
Table 3. Factors inﬂuencing willingness-to-pay levels at user household and user group levels
Treatment category Household willingness-to-pay per month (USD) Group willingness-to-pay per month (USD)
Mean (st.dev) Mean (st.dev)
Management CPR (n = 26) 0.72 (0.47) 22.52 (34.43)
Club (n = 32) 1.03 (0.69) 23.80 (29.18)
Private (n = 8) 1.20 (1.91) 1.43 (2.05)
Handpump density* Single (n = 18) 1.12 (0.78) 40.79 (51.04)
Pair (n = 14) 0.79 (0.49) 22.03 (6.75)
Cluster (n = 27) 0.76 (0.52) 11.28 (7.90)
Use* Domestic (n = 7) 0.61 (0.40) 35.76 (56.31)
Productive (n = 8) 1.58 (1.10) 48.69 (54.19)
Both uses (n = 44) 0.79 (0.41) 16.08 (10.03)
Estimated quantity* Low (n = 10) 1.15 (0.63) 31.65 (47.76)
Medium (n = 28) 0.91 (0.75) 15.09 (13.13)
High (n = 13) 0.66 (0.30) 36.91 (44.25)
Serviced* Yes (n = 41) 0.92 (0.68) 24.98 (36.74)
No (n = 18) 0.79 (0.47) 17.95 (12.17)
*Only considering community pumps (CPRs and clubs; n = 59), excluding private pumps.
404 WORLD DEVELOPMENTfound the same factors to be relevant in the post-construction
phase. User group decisions on stricter enforcement mecha-
nisms – from membership joining fees, regular payments,
and labor contributions through to higher household contri-
butions to maintenance costs in case of impending congestion
– also strengthen the sense of ownership among group mem-
bers, which links the club good approach to the
sense-of-ownership discussion. Whereas Marks and Davis
(2012) emphasize the intensity of individual factors, we draw
on a number of measures reinforcing each other to make an
aggregate impact.
This study suggests a distinction between membership clubs
and common pool resource groups, the consequences of which
have yet to be considered. While membership clubs may have
a positive impact on the ﬁnancial sustainability of handpumps,
exclusion may have repercussions for the communities. The
beneﬁts of CPR management models must therefore not be
disregarded. Ostrom (1990) demonstrates that if
self-organizing principles are adopted, an institution may be
relatively robust. This applies to common pool resources as
well as club goods; however, the lower excludability of CPR
groups may help to reduce the potential for community con-
ﬂict, which exclusion might provoke. While no such conﬂicts
were observed in the communities, it is acknowledged that
handpump clubs can exacerbate ﬁnancial and social inequality
– through wealth, kinship, or other factors. These potential
social repercussions as well as the implications for the Human
Right to Water and Sanitation (UNGA, 2010), require further
investigation. At the same time progressive realization of uni-
versal drinking water services requires ﬁnancial sustainability.
Handpumps managed as club goods contribute to progressing,
and critically maintaining, universal services consistent with
property rights regimes for piped water systems in urban
Africa, such as kiosks, which are not open access but provide
the poor with a lower cost and generally safer water supply
than other alternatives (Kjelle´n & McGranhan, 2006).
(c) Institutional design and handpump usage
The handpump user groups that have a tighter organiza-
tional structure appear to be those with a higher demand forwater. Club handpumps have a 57% higher usage level than
CPR handpumps. Figure 4 shows the increasing usage levels
with increasing exclusivity levels (sixfold increase). This sug-
gests that club handpumps need a more exclusive management
structure in order to prevent over-abstraction and queuing at
sources where demand is relatively high (H2). The user group
safeguards the desired degree of exclusiveness primarily
through adaptation of payment levels.
Not only the abstraction quantity per user group but also
the intended use is relevant. Productively used water shows
high willingness-to-pay levels (USD 1.58 per user per month
versus USD 0.61 per user per month for domestic-use pumps),
supporting the water-pays-for-water hypothesis, which implies
that using water for income-generating activities has a greater
perceived value than purely domestic uses. Pumps with both
productive and domestic use have 2.3 times the weekly mean
output compared to solely domestic-use pumps (900 liters
per day versus 400 liters per day). The productive use of water
also confounds estimates of demand based on population data
and assumptions on personal use patterns. Having objective
handpump usage data enables the spatial mapping of demand
for water (see Figure 5). Given the reality of limited resources
and inevitable trade-oﬀs, this information can provide an
objective basis for investments in water infrastructure, be that
the installation of more handpumps or determining the best
place to upgrade to a powered pump and tank or the transi-
tion to a piped water scheme.
When willingness-to-pay is compared to measured usage,
the following pattern emerges: high-use pumps, above
36,000 liters per month (75th percentile and above), have the
highest mean group willingness-to-pay of USD 37 per month;
low-use pumps, with abstractions below 6,000 liters per month
(25th percentile), show a willingness-to-pay of USD 32 per
group; medium-use pumps, between 6,000 and 36,000 liters
per month (up to 75th percentile), have the lowest
willingness-to-pay per user group at USD 15 per month. This
relationship is nonmonotonic, and thus cannot simply be
explained by looking at the demand for water at a pump in
isolation. The geographical distribution of pumps, in particu-
lar a pump’s location in relationship to other pumps must be
considered.
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Figure 4. Abstraction versus exclusivity.
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PAYMENTS
Geographic factors also inﬂuence rural water user pay-
ments. Population density does not generally vary across all
three groups; however the geographic distribution of pumps
does. The existence of alternative sources is likely to reduce
the willingness of users to pay for operation and maintenance
of a certain pump since they can easily switch to another one.
Thus handpump density has implications for operational man-
agement and investment planning. In Kyuso there are 17 sin-
gle pumps, eight pairs, and four clusters (eight pumps on
average per cluster) according to deﬁnition (see Section 3(b)).
The research has shown that isolation of pumps inﬂuences
the institutional design of user groups. The average group sizeFigure 5. Handpump usage by avfor single pumps is 43 household members, for pairs 32 house-
hold members and for clusters 27 household members. Con-
sidering community handpumps, the willingness-to-pay level
of households at single pumps is 42% higher than that of pairs;
moreover, it is 47% higher for singles than for clusters. This
tendency is consolidated at group level. At user group level
singles have an 85% higher willingness-to-pay than pairs,
and a 2.6 times higher willingness-to-pay than clusters. The
relationship is signiﬁcant (F = 5.355; df = 2; p < 0.01), which
supports the hypothesis that payments are related to hand-
pump density (H3). This also explains why medium-use pumps
(between 6,000 and 36,000 liters per month) showed a lower
willingness-to-pay at the group level than high-use or
low-use pumps. In Kyuso, medium-use pumps are dispropor-
tionately those in clusters.
Considering opportunity cost, users generally tend to prefer
paying higher fees to walking greater distances to alternative
handpumps (Hulton, 2012; Sorenson, Morssink, Abril, &
Campos, 2011). This fact is highlighted by Narayan (1993),
who shows that the presence of alternatives is the major cause
for pump users not to invest in a well as they lack incentives.
Thus handpump clustering is at best ineﬃcient, and at worst a
counter-productive planning decision (see Figure 6).6. SERVICE DELIVERY AND RURAL WATER USER
PAYMENTS
Poor service levels appear to be the most important barrier
to sustaining water user payments. Increased reliability,
enabled through mobile monitoring, constitutes a critical com-
ponent of demand as it aﬀects other preferences. For this pur-erage liters per month, 2013.
Figure 6. Willingness-to-pay (household/month) as agreed by each handpump user group.
406 WORLD DEVELOPMENTpose, monthly payment levels per household of the time before
the service started were compared with willingness-to-pay
levels after the users had experienced the service (n = 46) –
including those private pumps that would join the payment
model. The increase is ﬁvefold from USD 0.2 to USD 1 per
household per month (Table 4). This can be related to the fact
that the new level of service produced a tenfold decrease in
handpump downtime from 27 to 2.6 days on average over
the 1-year study period (Oxford/RFL, 2014), which represents
an order of magnitude improvement found to be critical in the
baseline survey (Hope, 2014). Moreover, the number of hand-
pump groups intending to contribute monthly – rather than
making post-breakdown payments – increased threefold
(Table 4).
The ﬁndings suggest that payments are contingent on service
delivery, thus supporting hypothesis H4. The aspects of service
delivery that were most valued by the water users were the
speed of service (77%), the quality of the service (54%), and
the knowledge that the service is guaranteed (31%). The focus
group participants also endorsed mobile payments as an
acceptable payment mode, especially as mobile payments are
already used for remittances by at least one member in each
focus group. The average willingness-to-pay for a
mobile-enabled service at all 66 pumps is USD 0.92 per house-
hold; the average monthly group willingness-to-pay is USD 21
per month across all pumps. Of the sample of 66 handpumps,
70% required at least one repair in 2013, with 63% of broken
handpumps requiring more than one repair. The average cost
of each repair was USD 62 (Oxford/RFL, 2014). If the stated
willingness-to-pay of all pump user groups reﬂected the actual
future payment collected, this would raise suﬃcient revenue tohave covered all repair costs in 2013; however, if communities
chose not to pool revenue, 43% of communities would not
have met their individual costs (Oxford/RFL, 2014). Equal
monthly payments and equal cost-sharing are therefore
deemed universally important. With the given level of accep-
tance and use of mobile phones in Kyuso, a mobile-enabled
service delivery model is socially acceptable and familiar as
well as practical and eﬃcient.
The beneﬁt of higher revenues can lead to a cycle of
improved pump maintenance triggering higher returns for
users (Figure 7). The spiral of decline and discontent among
users leading to nonpayment and long-term pump nonfunc-
tionality can be reversed through an eﬀective maintenance sys-
tem that facilitates demand for higher service levels (The
World Bank Water Demand Research Team, 1993), which is
expressed by greater willingness-to-pay. Translating this
willingness-to-pay into actual payments requires strong insti-
tutions with enforcement mechanisms. Madrigal, Alpı´zar,
and Schlu¨ter (2011) point to the signiﬁcance of a set of work-
ing rules enforced by the local communities. At the same time,
satisfying user preferences reinforces institutional stability
(Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 2010). Even beyond
willingness-to-pay, a study by Ali, Fjeldstad, and Sjursen
(2014) ﬁnds that satisfaction with public service provision
supports a tax-compliant attitude among Kenyans and
other sub-Saharan Africans, which may indicate that
willingness-to-pay will eventually translate into payments
recognizing the new service level. Altogether, the measures dis-
cussed above have profound implications for the operational
and institutional challenges of community management of
handpumps.
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PUMP-PRIMING PAYMENTS FOR SUSTAINABLE WATER SERVICES IN RURAL AFRICA 4077. OPERATIONALIZING AND INSTITUTIONALIZING
RURAL WATER SERVICES AND USER PAYMENTS
(a) Harnessing mobile technology for monitoring and payment
Mobile monitoring and mobile payments have the potential
to improve traditional payment systems with beneﬁts for both
service provider and water user. For the former, it provides an
eﬀective monitoring system that “would be alert to all credible
problems and notify maintenance responses in a timely and
constant manner” (Thomson et al., 2012b, p. 283), thus not
only enabling fast repairs but also contractual oversight. For
the latter, beneﬁts include a more transparent ﬁnancial system
and a higher level of water security through regular repairs
(Hutchings et al., 2012). While mobile monitoring facilitates
a hitherto impossible alignment of service delivery with user
level demand through monitoring functionality and abstrac-
tion, mobile payments facilitate direct ﬁnancial ﬂows back to
the maintenance service provider (Figure 7). Mobile technol-
ogy could therefore act as a conduit for reliable information
and ﬁnancial ﬂows, thus achieving the central objective of
strengthening handpump sustainability while increasing ﬁnan-
cial transparency and security. The service provider may
achieve a better understanding of the ﬁnancial capacity of
water user groups while users can monitor their management
committees through feedback loops, which would counter
potential mismanagement of handpump ﬁnances. Without
strict group level enforcement measures, the entire group
may lose interest in fee collection (Harvey & Reed, 2004).
Mobile technology is not a panacea for Kenya’s and other
countries’ rural water supply problems. There are numerous
obstacles impeding the successful delivery of a
mobile-enabled service, including the lack of signal and elec-
tricity for recharging mobile phones, together with operational
problems of crowd-sourcing. However, these technical chal-
lenges are surmountable with coverage and subscription levels
continuously increasing. Technology is an enabler that creates
the opportunity for novel management models, which were
not previously possible; yet it will not train and equip mechan-
ics, enforce agreed payment levels, or conduct a spare parts
inventory check. Overall, success is contingent upon the will-
ingness of the people to participate. “Getting the human side
of things right. . . [is] much harder than making the technology
work” (Daraja, 2012). Nevertheless, this study has shown that,
by aligning rural water supply systems to the service level
demand formed through socio-economic preferences and
translated into the institutional design of user groups, the
ﬁnancial sustainability of community handpumps may be
improved. Mobile technology is a useful tool for aligning sup-
ply and demand – but only if the institutional structure at the
community and supra-communal level are suﬃciently robust
to nurture and exploit its full potential.
(b) Developing an output-based payment framework
Overcoming the barriers to rural water user payments is an
essential step in the global drive toward achieving the water
targets of the sustainable development agenda. An
output-based payment model represents a new framework
for donor and government behavior in Kenya and other
African countries (Figure 8) within the wider initiatives on
result-based payment approaches (DFID, 2014; Hope, 2014).
The cycle of improved service delivery presented above consti-
tutes the ﬁrst building block at the sub-national level where
ﬁnances ﬂow from communities whose payments are clustered
to a performance-based maintenance service provider, who in
Figure 7. Cycle of improved service delivery.
Figure 8. An output-based payment model of rural water services (Oxford/RFL, 2014).
408 WORLD DEVELOPMENTturn is monitored and regulated by local and national govern-
ments. The national rural water regulation system documents
existing and new investments by environmental, technical, and
operational indicators, thus providing a valuable resource for
monitoring and regulating investment behavior and outcomes
at scale. The sub-national level can provide regular informa-
tion on performance and user payments, lending itself to themodel of a results-based ﬁnancing mechanism that supports
the provision of basic public services. This can be facilitated
by delegating the delivery of outputs, such as a functioning
maintenance service, to a third party in exchange for the pay-
ment of a subsidy upon delivery of speciﬁc outputs. It can thus
address a potential funding gap between the cost of service
delivery and the beneﬁciaries’ ability and willingness to pay
PUMP-PRIMING PAYMENTS FOR SUSTAINABLE WATER SERVICES IN RURAL AFRICA 409the full amount of user fees for the service (GPOBA, 2014;
IDA, 2009). Hence this system can continuously inform
national government goals and priorities while supporting glo-
bal water policy approaches.8. STUDY LIMITATIONS
Five limitations are identiﬁed in this study. First, the study
site is in one District in rural Kenya with a unique
hydro-climatic, geological, social, and political landscape; no
claim is made to generalize the ﬁndings though there is conﬁ-
dence in internal validity. Second, the free maintenance service
may have biased upwardly informant responses, particularly
on payment levels, toward the end of the study given the suc-
cessful performance of the technology. As noted, there are sig-
niﬁcant methodological concerns with willingness-to-pay
studies (see e.g. Davis, 2004). Aware of the issues, we have
attempted to be conservative in the estimates and associated
implications. We could not address all the broader scope
socio-cultural factors aﬀecting willingness-to-pay of users.
Third, insuﬃcient resources were available to conduct analysis
of environmental variation (hydrogeology, recharge, water
quality) or technical components (installation quality, depth
of well), which may confound some of the results. Future work
aims to include natural and human-related contamination to
understand the extent to which this key variable aﬀects water
payment behaviors. Fourth, the research team worked closely
with but independently from the Government of Kenya Dis-
trict Water Oﬃce and staﬀ. While government support was
instrumental in the research, we acknowledge such collabora-
tion may have aﬀected community behavior despite enforcing
strict ethical and human informant measures on conﬁdential-
ity and anonymity. Fifth, the data on handpump usage are
presented as an estimated value for volumetric abstraction
over a given period. This is based on calibrations of handle
movements against observed ﬂow prior to the start of the
study (Thomson et al., 2012a). The same calibration coeﬃ-
cients were used for all pumps throughout the study, so slight
diﬀerences in pump dynamics between pumps and across time
will not have been captured. We acknowledge the associated
inaccuracies in this approach, but highlight the novel insights
this technique allows in understanding factors contributing to
sustainable rural water service delivery.9. CONCLUSION
This study identiﬁes three major ﬁndings to prime rural
water user payments in Africa. First, a reliable and fast main-
tenance service is key to sustaining rural water user payments.
Second, these payments are subject to demand, which is
related to the spatial distribution of handpumps. Hence, clus-
tering should be avoided for ﬁnancially sustainable services
and new handpump installations determined by veriﬁable met-
rics. Third, the management of community handpumps takes
several forms along the public–private spectrum. Almost halfof the handpumps self-organize in clubs and choose a
semi-privatized model with a higher payment structure.
The empirical ﬁndings suggest that there are two linked and
potentially competing arguments: First, sustainable water ser-
vices require new approaches to tackle the widely documented
failure beyond infrastructure construction and the associated
limitations of current monitoring practices. Second, the uni-
versal water access argument requires approaches that are
sustainable. Historically, the latter has been applied at the
expense of the former with major waste of resources
(Baumann, 2009). We provide new insights to advance theory
on improving sustainable water services for the rural poor
through the club good model. However, the legacy and lim-
ited accountability of external interventions by donors and
government can undermine the model as illustrated by cluster-
ing handpumps, which may neither be cost-eﬀective nor deli-
ver sustainable services. If sustainability is not achieved
through the eﬀorts of functioning institutions, the human
right to safe drinking water is generally infringed, not only
for those who do not have access yet. Acknowledging the
requirement of progressive realization is therefore realistic
as well as beneﬁcial to a growing number of sub-Saharan
Africans, if steps are taken by communities and governments
alike toward the full realization of the human right, using the
“maximum available resources” and “ensuring that the right
can be realized for present and future generations” (UNGA,
2013).
Understanding operational, geographic, and institutional
barriers of rural water user payments contributes to develop-
ing an innovative, output-based payment model for rural
water services in Africa. The real test will be if users support
the introduction of a new payment system, which acknowl-
edges the higher value for money that the new maintenance
service system creates. This research indicates that such
reforms are supported by the communities if reliable services
are delivered. The ﬁndings oﬀer pathways toward the sug-
gested water targets of the post-2015 sustainable development
agenda promoting, inter alia, universal and sustainable access
to safe drinking water and raising service standards, as well as
robust and eﬀective water governance with more eﬀective insti-
tutions and administrative systems (UN Water, 2014). It
demonstrates the need for continuous monitoring of rural
water services, as well as suggesting strategies for achieving
this. Water service performance data are key to deﬁning a
baseline and measuring progress toward sustainable services
at the local level, for operationalizing a maintenance service
provider model at the supra-communal level and testing an
output-based payment model at the national and international
levels. The Government of Kenya’s Water Services Regulatory
Board (WASREB) acknowledges the importance of such per-
formance data “enabling WASREB to ensure that satisfactory
performance levels are achieved and maintained, and
enhancing transparency and accountability within the rural
sector” (WASREB, 2014, p. 79). Thus, the data can support
and monitor national policy goals that promote progress
toward universal access and more reliable improved water ser-
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